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Abstract
This paper studies the falsiﬁability of the hypothesis of Nash behav-
ior, for the case of a ﬁnite number of players who choose from continuous
domains, subject to constraints. The results obtained here are negative.
Assuming the observation of ﬁnite data sets, and using weak, but non-
trivial, requirements for rationalizability, I show that the hypothesis is
falsiﬁable, as it imposes nontautological, nonparametric testable restric-
tions. An assessment of these restrictions, however, shows that they are
extremely weak, and that a researcher should expect, before observing
the data set, that the test based on these restrictions will be passed by
observed data. Without further speciﬁc assumptions, there do not ex-
ist harsher tests, since the conditions derived here also turn out to be
suﬃcient. Moreover, ruling out the possibility that individuals may be
cooperating so as to attain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes is impossible, as this
behavior is in itself unfalsiﬁable with ﬁnite data sets. Imposing aggrega-
tion, or strategic complementarity and/or substitutability, if theoretically
plausible, may provide for a harsher test.
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1 Introduction:
The standard for what is to be considered scientiﬁc knowledge has been a promi-
nent topic of debate in Epistemology. One of the most inﬂuential philosophers
of the last century, Karl Popper, argued that scientists should actively try to
prove their theories wrong, rather than merely trying to verify them through
inductive reasoning. Hausman (1992) summarizes the methodology of Popper
a st h r e es i m p l er u l e s :
“(1) Propose and consider only testable or falsiﬁable theories;
(2) seek only to falsify scientiﬁc theories; (3) accept theories that
1withstand attempts to falsify them as worthy of further discussion,
never as certain...”
Accordingly, the Popperian postulate sustains that scientiﬁc discovery ought
to follow four steps: (i) the internal consistency of a theory must be formally
checked, to verify that it contains no logical inconsistencies; (ii) the logical prin-
ciples of the theory must be distinguished from its empirical implications; (iii)
the theory must be compared with alternative existing theoretical knowledge
that has not been refuted by empirical evidence, in order to ascertain whether
it can explain phenomena that cannot be explained by the existing knowledge;
(iv) ﬁnally, the theory must be submitted to tests of its empirical implications,
in order for it to be corroborated (but not veriﬁed) or refuted.1 Interesting tests
are those that are “harsh,” in the sense that, ap r i o r i , the theory would appear
likely to fail them. And if a theory fails a test, and there exists no reasonable
excuse that can itself be tested, then the theory should be abandoned.2
This “empiricist” position, often referred to as “Falsiﬁcationism,” had been
previously exposed by one of the greatest mathematicians of the Nineteenth
Century, Henri Poincaré, who in 1908 wrote that3 “...when a theory has been
established, we have ﬁrst to look for cases in which the rule stands the best
chance of being found at fault.” The principle was introduced to economics
by Paul Samuelson, for whom “meaningful theorems” are hypotheses “... about
empirical data which could conceivably be refuted” (see Samuelson (1947), p.4).
Over the last decades, game theory has arisen as a prominent ﬁeld in math-
ematics and economics, allowing for logically consistent and extremely elegant
explanations of human behavior under interaction. The development of the the-
ory was built largely upon the concept of Nash equilibrium, which came to be
a p p l i e di nm a n yd i ﬀerent problems, and extended and reﬁn e di nm a n yd i ﬀer-
ent ways. Nonetheless, much fewer attempts to derive harsh empirical tests of
these developments have appeared in the literature. In terms of the Popperian
rules, this would cast doubt on knowledge derived from applications of game
theoretical concepts, which should not be treated as scientiﬁc, for only testable
ideas deserve such treatment. In terms of the steps of scientiﬁc discovery pre-
sented in the introduction, game theory still needs to strengthen its position by
completing step (ii) and then allowing for applications of step (iv).
1Godel´s undecidability principle shows that within the logical scope of any axiomatic
theory there exist propositions whose truth or falsehood cannot be established based only on
the axioms of the theory (the principles of point (ii)). One should not conclude from this
that every theory is unfalsiﬁable: falsiﬁability requires that logical propositions, which can
actually be proven from the logical principles, should be contrastable with reality, so as to
ascertain the refutability of the logical principles of the theory. Those propositions whose
logical validity cannot be ascertained from the axioms of the theory are out of the scope of
the falsiﬁactionist method.
2The Popperian view has found strong criticism. For example, Hausman (1992) criticizes
the position that one should only try to falsify theories, treating them as nothing more than
“...conjectures ... worth of criticism,” which Hausman ﬁnds “outrageous” (see chapter 6. Quo-
tations are from page 81.) For a defense of (some of) the Popperian postulate, see Hutchison
(1994).
3See Zalah (2001).
2Even if one considers the views of Popper to be too extreme,4 it seems
desirable to obtain testable implications from game theoretical concepts that
can prove inadequate their applications to speciﬁc problems. This paper studies
the existence testable implications of the application of Nash equilibrium to
an abstract situation in which ﬁnitely many agents individually choose from
continuous domains, subject to constraints, and their satisfaction depends on
the collective choice. I assume all the principles behind the concept of Nash
equilibrium, namely that each agent acts as if he were choosing a most satisfying
alternative, according to some preferences, while taking as given what the others
are, in eﬀect, doing. Preferences, of course, are not subject to tests, since they
cannot be observed. But if one assumes that choices are observed, the following
question can be asked: when can one say that the principles of Nash behavior
cannot explain the observed choices? I propose an answer to this question in
the form of testable restrictions and study how harsh a test these restrictions
provide for.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I survey the existing results
that are related to this paper, and point out the diﬀerences between the prob-
lems addressed here and there. Section 3 explains the speciﬁcp r o b l e mt h a tI
deal with, derives the testable implications of my application of the Nash equi-
librium concept, studies how harsh these restrictions are and whether one could
ﬁnd harsher tests. Section 4 then compares the empirical implications of the
application of the Nash equilibrium concept with the ones that arise from a
prominent alternative hypothesis, namely that individuals cooperate to always
choose Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes. Section 5 studies whether imposing additional
conditions, whose validity would have to be evaluated in speciﬁc applications,
can result in harsher tests of our theory. Section 6 oﬀers some concluding re-
marks.
2 Review of the literature:
There exist few results regarding the existence of testable restrictions of appli-
cations of game theoretical concepts. In unpublished work, Zhou (1999) studies
the following problem: suppose that there are two individuals, each of whom
chooses form some (ﬁxed) interval from the real line, and suppose that one is
given a ﬁnite subset of the Cartesian product of the two intervals. Zhou deter-
mines conditions on this set, which are equivalent to the existence of individual
preferences such that the “observed set” is the Nash set of the game played by
the two individuals if they have those preferences.5 Given that there do exist
sets that violate Zhou’s condition, one concludes that, upon observation of the
4Modern defenders of Falsiﬁcationism maintain more moderate positions. See Hutchison
(1994).
5Zhou assumes that preferences are representable by utility functions that are continuous
and quasiconcave in own action. The condition that he ﬁnds, which he calls “no improper
crossing,” implies that the best response functions of individuals do not intersect at points
other than the elements of the set.
3ﬁnite set, the hypothesis that these observations, and only these observations,
may come from Nash behavior is refutable.
A similar problem, for the case of ﬁnite domains, is considered by Sprumont
(2000), who studies a game played by a ﬁn i t es e to fp l a y e r s ,e a c ho fw h o m
c a nc h o o s ef r o maﬁnite set. Suppose that one constructs a collective budget
by choosing for each individual a nonempty subset of his choice set and then
taking their Cartesian product, and that one “observes” a nonempty subset of
it, as being chosen as the collective outcome. If we did this for all possible
collective budgets we could construct an outcome correspondence mapping the
collection of all collective choices to their chosen subsets. This correspondence
would depend only on observables. The question that Sprumont answers is:
what conditions does this correspondence have to satisfy if for each individual
there exists a preference relation over the collective choice set such that the
correspondence maps each collective budget to its Nash set under those pref-
erences. Sprumont ﬁnds conditions that are necessary and suﬃcient for the
rationalizability of the outcome correspondence in the mentioned sense.6 Given
that there are correspondences that violate these conditions, Sprumont con-
cludes that, upon observation of the outcome correspondence, the application
of Nash behavior to this kind of problems is falsiﬁable.
The analysis in Sprumont focuses on normal form games. The almost perfect
analogous for extensive-form games with perfect information is Ray and Zhou
(2000). Suppose that we have a ﬁnite, extensive-form game, and that we can
observe an outcome function mapping the set of reduced games7 of the original
game into the set of its terminal nodes. Zhou and Ray study conditions under
which, for each individual, there exists an order over the terminal nodes such
that the image of each reduced game under the outcome function is its subgame-
perfect equilibrium if individual preferences were precisely those orders.8 Ray
and Zhou also show that their conditions are independent, and that examples
that violate one of them are not rationalizable in the mentioned sense, even if
they satisfy the other two. The conclusion is again that, upon observation of
6The ﬁrst condition, “persistence under expansion,” is satisﬁed if whenever an outcome
is chosen in two diﬀerent members of the collection of collective budgets, it is also chosen
in the smaller member of this collection that contains their union. The second condition,
“persistence under contraction,” says, subject to some qualiﬁcation, that when going from a
larger to a smaller member of the collection, the outcomes chosen in the larger member that
“survive” the contraction should also be chosen in the smaller member.
7A reduced game is deﬁned by a subset of the original three that contains some terminal
nodes, and all the nonterminal nodes that belong to paths leading to them.
8There are three necessary and suﬃcient conditions. The ﬁrst one, which Ray and Zhou call
“acyclicity,” says that for each player the (incomplete) binary relation of revealed preferences
derived from the function must be acyclic. The second condition, “internal consistency,”
requires that the outcome of a reduced game, say a, be always also the outcome of all reduced
games that can be deﬁned as follows: if a0 is a predecessor of a, take the reduced game
deﬁned using as terminal nodes all those terminal nodes that deﬁned the original game and
are successors of a0. The third condition, called “subgame consistency,” requires that if a is
the outcome of a reduced game, then at each node leading to a, the player whose turn it is to
move should choose, in the reduced game with terminal nodes a and the outcome that would
be reached should he choose a strategy not leading to a, the strategy that leads to a.T h e s e
conditions are shown to be not only necessary, but suﬃﬁent.
4such an outcome function, the results of applying the concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium to this kind of problems are falsiﬁable.
These three works consider the behavioral principles behind the Nash equi-
librium concept. In contrast, Chiappori (1988) considers the implications of
cooperative behavior in a less abstract setting. Suppose that one observes a
two-member household, each of whose members derives utility from his or her
own consumption and leisure, as well as from the ones of the other member,
facing a joint budget constraint. The question that Chiappori answers is: do
there exist conditions on the observations of individual labor supply and ag-
gregate consumption under which there exist individual preferences such that
the observations are Pareto-eﬃcient collective decisions, under these preferences
and given (observed) individual wages? Chiappori shows that such conditions
indeed exist,9 and are both necessary and suﬃcient, and that there exist obser-
vations that could not be rationalized in the mentioned sense. It is concluded
that the principles of Pareto behavior applied in this particular setting produce
af a l s i ﬁable hypothesis.
The present paper is mostly related to Zhou (1999) and Sprumont (2000).
The problem considered here is the following: suppose that one observes a ﬁ-
nite set of players, each of whom chooses from an interval from the real line.
A constraint is modeled as a lower and an upper bound to what a player can
choose. Suppose that one observes a ﬁnite sequence of proﬁles of constraints
and choices. In this paper I ask the question of what conditions on this sequence
are necessary (and suﬃcient) for the existence of individual preferences over the
Cartesian product of all intervals, such that for each observed proﬁle of con-
straints, the corresponding observed proﬁle of choices is a Nash equilibrium of
the game played under the constrained domain if individuals have these prefer-
ences. (Trivial answers to the question are ruled out by assumptions explained
below.)
The interest in continuous domains is easily motivated. Suppose that the
government is trying to provide a public good and would like the consumers
to reveal their valuations of it, or consider the cases of a private value auction,
an economy in which externalities arise from the consumption or production of
some commodity, or Bertrand or Cournot oligopolies. In all these cases, the set
of conceivable actions of each player can be taken to be an interval in R.
In that sense, my problem is clearly related to the one studied by Zhou
(1999), and hence their diﬀerences, although simple, deserve to be pointed out.
First, I do not assume that there are only two players. Second, I allow for
constraints on the actions of the players to be exogenously imposed, which was
not the case in Zhou (1999). Third, and most importantly, my requirement
for the individual preferences is weaker that Zhou’s in that I do not rule out
the existence of other equilibria in the constrained games besides the ones that
appear on the observed data set. This diﬀerence is crucial. In my case, the
weaker requirement comes at the cost of needing to impose stronger restrictions
9The conditions, which are mediated by existencial quantiﬁers, amount to a generalization
of the strong axiom of revealed preferences for collective choices.
5on the class of preferences allowed, in order to rule out trivial results (in which
players do not care about their own actions and, hence, every feasible outcome
is Nash equilibrium) which would render the theory unfalsiﬁable. The return
for incurring in this cost is that if an empirical application of my results is to be
carried out, there is no need to argue that in the ﬁnite data set one has observed
all the equilibria that the game has, which can be a very strong assumption.10
The assumption of continuous choice sets is an obvious diﬀerence with re-
spect to Sprumont (2000) and Ray and Zhou (2000). Additionally, I impose
weaker observational requirements on my tests than in both of these papers. I
only require that for each observed proﬁle of constraints, a proﬁle of actions be
observed. I do not require (actually, I do rule out) that all possible proﬁles of
constraints be observed, as is explicitly required by Sprumont, and implicitly
by Ray and Zhou, when they assume that the outcome of all reduced games
is observable. Furthermore, I do not assume that all the equilibria of the con-
strained games have been observed, as explicitly does Sprumont and implicitly
do Ray and Zhou, when they assume uniqueness of the subgame-perfect equilib-
ria. In contrast to these two papers, this double nonexhaustiveness may come
as an empirical advantage but, again, it implies my need to rule out triviality
via strong assumptions.
Finally, obvious diﬀerences with the analysis of Ray and Zhou (2000) is that I
study simultaneous-move games and with Chiappori (1988) that my main focus
is noncooperative behavior.
As in the other papers on noncooperative behavior, in particular Zhou (1999)
and Sprumont (2000), I take the principles of Nash behavior in their most salient
instance. That is, I assume that individuals do the best for themselves given
what the others are doing. I am hence subject to the general criticism to the
Nash solution for its strong informational requirement (or extreme accuracy in
conjecture formation) involved in individual decision-making processes. And in
that sense, this work does not advance the theory started by Bernheim (1984)
and Pearce (1984), where the question of rationalizability of strategic behavior
is answered from the perspective of beliefs and not only of preferences, as I do
here. The criticism is valid, but does not apply as strongly to my results as it
does to general theoretical applications of Nash equilibrium, as will be argued
in subsection 3.3.
3 Noncooperative behavior:
Let I be a nonempty, ﬁnite set of players. I will denote by I ∈ N, I > 2,t h e
number of players. Suppose that for each player i ∈ I, the set of conceivable
actions is the interval Ai =[ ai,ai],w h e r eai,ai ∈ R, ai < ai.T h i s s e t Ai is
10Suppose that we reject the hypothesis of Nash behavior based on Zhou’s test, using a
ﬁnite time series of observations, on the premise that one more equilibrium would need to
exist if all the observed outcomes also are to be equilibria. A “reasonable excuse” would be
that the extra equilibrium just happens to not have been played, with which the empirical
harshness of the test rapidly deteriorates.
6player i’s structural choice set, from where he could choose in the absence of
exogenous constraints.11
Given these structural feasible sets, I want to consider the possibility that,
conjunctionally, individuals are constrained in their choices. I model these con-
straints as lower and upper bounds to what they can choose. Besides these
bounds, the only other information that I assume can be observed is actual
individual choices. That is, I assume that a ﬁnite sequence is observed, each of
whose elements speciﬁes, for each player, a lower and an upper bound to what
he can choose and an actual choice. Formally:
Deﬁnition 1 Ad a t as e ti saﬁnite sequence
³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
such that:
(∀t ∈ {1,...,T})(∀i ∈ I):
¡
ai 6 ai,t < ai,t 6 ai ∧ a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤¢
Hence, for each observation t ∈ {1,...,T} = T and each player i ∈ I,
one observes three numbers: ai,t and ai,t are, respectively, the minimum and
maximum values that player i can choose at observation t,w h e r e a sa∗
i,t is what
he actually chose.12 Since one only wants to consider feasible data sets with
meaningful constraints, the conditions that the conjunctional constraint be at
least as tight that the structural one, without implying an empty or degenerate
f e a s i b l es e ta n dt h a tt h ea c t u a lc h o i c eb ef e a s i b l ea r ei m p o s e db yt h ed e ﬁnition.
My goal here is to derive testable implications on the observed sequence
which are implied by rational behavior in the sense of Nash equilibrium. A
deﬁnition of rational data set is then needed. I will say that a data set is,
or, rather, can be rationalized by Nash behavior, if one can ﬁnd individual
preferences over the collective domain
Q
i∈I Ai, such that for each observation
t ∈ T ,t h ep r o ﬁle of choices
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I is a Nash equilibrium of the game that these
players would play, if they had these preferences and each one were constrained
to choose from the subinterval
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
.O fc o u r s e ,t h i sd e ﬁnition is vacuous,
and Nash behavior unfalsiﬁable, unless one restricts the class of preferences
allowed in the rationalization. That is, if I allow preferences in which individuals
are indiﬀerent with respect to the value taken by their own choice, then every
individual choice can be a best response, every outcome is therefore a Nash
equilibrium and every data set is rationalizable. I then restrict the class of
preferences, so as to imply that individuals always have unique best responses.
Before the formal deﬁnition of rationalizability, the following notational con-
vention has to be introduced: given a player i ∈ I, a function
Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R
11Like the consumption set in consumer theory.
12Continuing the analogy of footnote 11, the interval
h
ai,t,ai,t
i
is like the budget set in
consumer theory, whereas a∗
i,t is analogous to the demand.
7where A−i =
Q
j∈I\{i}
Aj,a n dv e c t o r sa0,a0 ∈
Q
j∈I
Aj, a0 ¿ a0, I denote by Ui
a0,a0
the restriction of Ui to
[a0
i,a0
i] ×
Y
j∈I\{i}
£
a0
j,a0
j
¤
Also, if each player i ∈ I is constrained to choose from a set Bi ⊆ Ai,a n dh a s
preferences represented by
V i : Bi ×
Y
j∈I\{i}
Bj −→ R
Id e n o t eb yN
³¡
Bi,Vi¢
i∈I
´
the set of Nash equilibria of the game
¡
Bi,Vi¢
i∈I.
With this notation, the deﬁnition of what data sets will be considered con-
sistent with Nash behavior is:
Deﬁnition 2 Ad a t as e t
³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if for each i ∈ I there exists
Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R
continuous, such that for each a−i ∈ A−i, the function Ui (·,a −i) is diﬀeren-
tiable and strongly concave, and for each t ∈ T ,
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
In this case, it is said that
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data.
The assumption that rules out trivial rationalizations is strong concavity in
own actions, since it implies that individual best responses have to be unique,
given the convexity of the constraint sets.13 But I also impose other assump-
tions. Implicitly, I assume that preferences are representable by utility functions
and that these are continuous. Continuity is imposed out of plausibility, in order
to get some smoothness in the best responses of players, in the sense that small
enough changes in actions by other players produce small changes in individual
responses (by the theorem of the maximum). Since general representability re-
sults exist when preferences are continuous (Debreu, 1954) it is reasonable that
these two assumptions come together.14 Neither the assumption of concavity
13For the purposes of this and the next sections, strong quasiconcavity would suﬃce. Actual
concavity is used only in section 5.1, but the assumption is introduced here for the sake of
consistency.
14I also assume that these utility functions are diﬀerentiable in own action, but this as-
sumption plays no role in the general result, and we could dispense with it for the purposes
of this section. The assumption will be used in subsection 5.1, when I derive further testable
restrictions under extra assumptions.
8in own action nor the one of continuity are extraneous to game theory, as they
were used in the proof of existence of Nash equilibrium by Debreu (1952).15
Notice also that I do not impose any monotonicity requirements. The reason is
that imposing increasing monotonicity would trivialize the results, as for each
player i ∈ I, a∗
i,t = ai,t w o u l db ead o m i n a n ts t r a t e g y ,w h i l et h es a m ew o u l d
happen, with a∗
i,t = ai,t, if decreasing monotonicity were imposed.
T h er e a s o nw h yIc h o o s eaw e a kd e ﬁnition of rationalization, in the sense
that it only requires that for each t ∈ T ,
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
and not that
N
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
=
n¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
o
is that I do not want to assume, or imply, that one observes all possible equilibria
of the constrained games. Only one equilibrium is assumed to be observed,
and there is no reason for this equilibrium to be unique. Moreover, under my
assumptions it could very well be the case that for t,t0 ∈ T we have
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I 6=
¡
a∗
i,t0
¢
i∈I and still
¡
a∗
i,t0
¢
i∈I ∈ N
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
This is just a property of Nash-equilibrium in this context: suppose that for
some a0,a0 ∈
Q
i∈I Ai, a0 ¿ a0,a n ds o m e(a∗
i)i∈I ∈
Q
i∈I (a0
i,a0
i), one has that
(a∗
i)i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a0
i,a0
i],Ui
a0,a0
´
i∈I
¶
Then, for all a00,a00 ∈
Q
i∈I Ai, a00 ¿ a00,
(a∗
i)i∈I ∈
Y
i∈I
[a00
i ,a00
i ]= ⇒ (a∗
i)i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a00
i ,a00
i ],Ui
a00,a00
´
i∈I
¶
because
(a∗
i)i∈I ∈ N
µ³
[a0
i,a0
i],Ui
a0,a0
´
i∈I
¶
implies that for each i ∈ I, a∗
i is a local maximizer of Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i
¢
over [a0
i,a0
i],
and then, since a∗
i ∈ (a0
i,a0
i), it follows from the concavity assumption that a∗
i
is global maximizer of Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i
¢
over [ai,ai].
Hence, in order to maintain my weak observational requirements, I use a
weak concept of rationalization. This approach is not new, as it is the one
taken, for example, by Brown and Matzkin (1996). There, a ﬁnite data set of
prices and endowments is said to be rationalizable if there exist preferences of
15Debreu only requires weak concavity, as does Zhou (1999). They both impose continuity.
9the agents such that each observation of prices is a competitive equilibrium price
vector of the exchange economy given the corresponding endowments. It is not
required that such an equilibrium be unique, nor is there a reason to expect
that it will be. I will address this issue again in subsection 3.2.
There are two reasons why I chose to rationalize a ﬁnite data set, rather
than some outcome correspondence. (These results must be seen as nonpara-
metric.) One is that ﬁnite data sets is what typically one will have available
when trying to apply the results obtained here. The other reason is deeper: since
parametric functions typically are derived from ﬁnite data, rejection of the ra-
tionalizability hypothesis could come from either a nonrationalizable data set
or a nonrationalizable functional form applied to probably rationalizable data
(Varian (1983) and Chiappori (1988)). This does not mean that the parametric
approach is not interesting, but rather that its power is fully exploited after a
nonparametric test.
3.1 General testable restrictions:
Following the Popperian postulate, I now study the problem of what conditions
must the observables of the theory satisfy, if one is to say that they are the result
of the behavior assumed by the theory. In other words, if individuals behave
according to the principles behind Nash equilibrium, what are the necessary
conditions (which should not be tautologies,) that have to be exhibited by the
observed data set? Theorem 1 below derives these conditions and shows that
they are all the conditions that can be derived, as they are independent of one
another and also suﬃcient.
Theorem 1 Ad a t as e t
³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if, and only if, for all t,t0 ∈ T and all i ∈ I :
1.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
a∗
i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
2.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
a∗
i,t > ai,t0



=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
3.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
a∗
i,t 6 ai,t0



=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
10Proof. Necessity:L e t
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalize the data.
Suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t,t0 ∈ T such that a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0, a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
,
a∗
i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t 6= a∗
i,t0. Without loss of generality, assume that
Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
6 Ui ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
.L e tai = 1
2
¡
a∗
i,t + a∗
i,t0
¢
.C l e a r l y ,ai ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,
whereas by strong concavity Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
>U i ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
, contradicting the
fact that
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. This proves condition (1).
For condition (2), let i ∈ I and t,t0 ∈ T be such that a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0,
a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
, a∗
i,t > ai,t0.I ﬁrst claim that ∀a ∈
£
ai,a ∗
i,t
¢
, Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
<
Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
. To see this, suppose not: ∃a ∈
£
ai,a ∗
i,t
¢
: Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
>
Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
.I fa > ai,t,t h e n
1
2
a +
1
2
a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and
Ui
µ
1
2
a +
1
2
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¶
>
1
2
Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
+
1
2
Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
> Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Hence, it follows from rationalizability that a<a i,t. Let
θ =
a∗
i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
Clearly, θ ∈ (0,1) and, therefore, by strong concavity,
Ui ¡
θa+( 1− θ)a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
>θ U i ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
+( 1− θ)Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
> Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
However,
θa+( 1− θ)a∗
i,t =
a∗
i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢a +
Ã
1 −
a∗
i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
!
a∗
i,t
=
a∗
i,t − ai,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢a +
a∗
i,t − 2a + ai,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢ a∗
i,t
=
aa∗
i,t − aai,t +
¡
a∗
i,t
¢2 − 2aa∗
i,t + ai,ta∗
i,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
=
¡
a∗
i,t
¢2 − aa∗
i,t − aai,t + ai,ta∗
i,t
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
=
a∗
i,t
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
+ ai,t
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
2
¡
a∗
i,t − a
¢
=
a∗
i,t + ai,t
2
11which implies that θa +( 1− θ)a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
. This contradicts the fact that ¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set.
I also claim that ∀a,a0 ∈
£
ai,a ∗
i,t
¤
,s u c ht h a ta<a 0, Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
<U i ¡
a0,a ∗
−i,t
¢
.
If a0 = a∗
i,t, the result follows from the the previous claim. Now, suppose that
a0 <a ∗
i,t.L e t
θ =
a∗
i,t − a0
a∗
i,t − a
Clearly, θ ∈ (0,1) and therefore
Ui ¡
θa+( 1− θ)a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
>θ U i ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
+( 1− θ)Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
>U i ¡
a,a∗
−i,t
¢
where the second inequality also follows from the previous claim. Now,
θa+( 1− θ)a∗
i,t =
a∗
i,t − a0
a∗
i,t − a
a +
Ã
1 −
a∗
i,t − a0
a∗
i,t − a
!
a∗
i,t
=
a∗
i,t − a0
a∗
i,t − a
a +
a0 − a
a∗
i,t − a
a∗
i,t
=
aa∗
i,t − aa0 + a0a∗
i,t − aa∗
i,t
a∗
i,t − a
= a0
which establishes the claim.
Now, since a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0,i ti sc l e a r∀a,a0 ∈
£
ai,a ∗
i,t
¤
, such that a<a 0,
Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t0
¢
<U i ¡
a0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
. Then, since a∗
i,t > ai,t0 it follows that ∀a,a0 ∈
[ai,ai,t0], such that a<a 0, Ui ¡
a,a∗
−i,t0
¢
<U i ¡
a0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
from where, by ratio-
nalizability, a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Condition (3) can be argued in a similar way.
Suﬃciency: For each i ∈ I,c o n s t r u c tT i ⊆ T according to the following
algorithm.
Algorithm 1 Input: ³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
1. S = T , T i = ∅
2. t =m i nS
3. Γ =
©
t0 ∈ T|a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
4. ∆ =
©
t0 ∈ Γ|a∗
i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0,ai,t0
¢ª
5. If ∆ 6= ∅,t h e nl e tτ =m i n
¡
Arg mint0∈∆ a∗
i,t0
¢
a n dg ot o9 .
126. Θ =
©
t0 ∈ Γ|a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
ª
7. If Θ 6= ∅,t h e nl e tτ =m i n
¡
Arg maxt0∈Θ a∗
i,t0
¢
a n dg ot o9 .
8. τ =m i n
¡
Arg mint0∈Γ a∗
i,t0
¢
9. T i = T i ∪ {τ}
10. S = S\Γ
11. If S = ∅,s t o p .
12. Go to 2.
Output: T i ⊆ T
The output of the algorithm has the following two properties:
(∀t ∈ T )
¡
∃τ ∈ T i¢
: a∗
−i,τ = a∗
−i,t ¡
∀τ,τ0 ∈ T i : τ 6= τ0¢
: a∗
−i,τ 6= a∗
−i,τ0
which imply that one can construct the following (well-deﬁned) function. Let
φ
i :
©
a∗
−i,t0
ª
t0∈T −→ Ai be deﬁned by
φ
i ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= a∗
i,τt where τt ∈ T i is such that a∗
−i,τt = a∗
−i,t
Since
©
a∗
−i,t0
ª
t0∈T ⊆ A−i is closed and φ
i :
©
a∗
−i,t0
ª
t0∈T −→ Ai is continuous
and bounded, by Tietze´s extension theorem (see, for example, theorem 3.12.3
in Bridges, 1988) there exists Φi : A−i −→ Ai, continuous, such that
³
∀a−i ∈
©
a∗
−i,t0
ª
t0∈T
´
: Φi (a−i)=φ
i (a−i)
Fix one such Φi : A−i −→ Ai and deﬁne Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R as
Ui (ai,a −i)=−
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
That Ui is continuous and ∀a−i ∈ A−i, Ui (·,a −i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave is straightforward. Hence, all that remains to show is that ¡
Ui¢
i∈I rationalizes the data set:
Let i ∈ I and t ∈ T .D e ﬁne Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T|a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
.O n e o f t h e
following three mutually exclusive cases must hold:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0,ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0∈(ai,t0,ai,t0)
a∗
i,t0
!
13By construction, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
from where, if t0
t = t,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Alternatively, suppose that t ∈ T\{ t0
t}.
If a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗
i,t0
t < ai,t and a∗
i,t < ai,t0
t,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t and a∗
i,t >a i,t0
t. Then, by condition (1),
a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, and, therefore,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗
i,t
whereas if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t 6
ai,t,t h e na∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t and contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (ii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t,
ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and,
therefore, by condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
(iii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t, ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t >a ∗
i,t,t h e n
ai,t = a∗
i,t
<a i,t0
t
<a ∗
i,t0
t
< ai,t
14which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) ﬁnally, if ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
and ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t imply, by condition (3), that a∗
i,t = ai,t,w h i c h
contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t >a i,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fa∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e n
a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t imply, by condition (2), that a∗
i,t = ai,t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t > a∗
i,t,
then a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
and a∗
i,t 6 ai,t0
t imply, by condition (3), that a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (iii) ﬁnally, if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t
and ai,t0
t <a ∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t = ai,t
<a ∗
i,t0
= a∗
i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0=ai,t0
a∗
i,t0
!
By construction, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
from where, if t0
t = t,
a∗
i,t, =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Now, suppose that t ∈ T\{ t0
t}.
If ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
15Alternatively, ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, from where, by construction, a∗
i,t = ai,t.T h e r ea r e
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t < ai,t0
t,
which is a contradiction, because a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t; (ii) if ai,t0
t <a i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e n
ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t and ai,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t, which implies, by
condition (1), that a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t and hence that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
(iii) if a∗
i,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗
i,t0
¶
By construction, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
Since a∗
i,t = ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t, it follows that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
The necessity of the conditions of the theorem, and the fact that they are
not tautologies, as it is easy to see that there exist data sets that violate them,
imply that the hypothesis of Nash behavior under the assumptions made here
is falsiﬁable. It is also easy to see that the conditions are independent of one
another. What is more important is that their suﬃciency implies that the
hypothesis does not have further or stronger testable restrictions.16
The intuition for the conditions of the theorem is simple. The ﬁrst condition
is a straightforward restatement of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preferences,
16Let H be a hypothesis and let T be a testable restriction implied by it (that is, H=⇒T,
where T involves only observables of the theory). A stronger testable restriction would be a
condition ST on observables only, such that H=⇒ST, but ¬(T=⇒ST). However, if T=⇒H,
it is clear that stronger testable restrictions cannot exist.
16for each i ∈ I and for pairs t,t0 ∈ T such that a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0:
a∗
i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
=⇒



a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
or
a∗
i,t / ∈
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
Whenever a∗
−i is ﬁxed, actions of player i, under the hypothesis of Nash behavior,
ought to maximize a ﬁxed utility function Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i
¢
subject to the particular
constraints. The Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference is a well known necessary
condition for this behavior, as shown in Richter (1966).
The second and third conditions are axioms of revealed monotonicity: when
player i chooses a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,o v e r
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,g i v e na∗
−i,t, by strong concavity
he is revealing that Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i,t
¢
is strictly increasing on
£
ai,a ∗
i,t
¤
. Hence, con-
ditional on a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t,i fai,t0 6 a∗
i,t,t h e no v e r
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
player i ought to
choose a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0. Similarly, when player i chooses a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
,o v e r £
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,g i v e na∗
−i,t, by strong concavity he is revealing that Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i,t
¢
is strictly decreasing on
£
a∗
i,t,ai
¤
. Hence, conditional on a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t,i f
ai,t0 > a∗
i,t,t h e no v e r
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
player i ought to choose a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0.
3.2 Weakness of the rationalization:
Recall that my deﬁnition of Nash-rationalizability is weak in the sense that it
only requires that each observed choice be an element of the Nash set of the
corresponding restricted game. As mentioned before, I do not (nor do I want to)
require that the Nash set of the restricted game be the singleton set containing
the observed choice. The risk that I am taking is then that, even though I
have imposed conditions to rule out the result that every possible outcome is a
Nash equilibrium, it could still be the case that almost every possible outcome
is a Nash equilibrium, and with the rationalization of theorem 1 one happens
to, in particular, pick the observed ones. As the following theorem shows, the
conditions of theorem 1 allow for local uniqueness of the observed Nash equilibria
(a property that will be generically shared by the rationalizations of Brown and
Matzkin (1996), mutatis mutandis).
Theorem 2 If a data set
³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
satisﬁes that for every t,t0 ∈ T and every i ∈ I :
1.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t0,ai,t0
¤
a∗
i,t0 ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
172.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
a∗
i,t > ai,t0



=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
3.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
a∗
i,t 6 ai,t0



=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
then, for each i ∈ I there exists Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R,s u c ht h a t
¡
Ui¢
i∈I
Nash-rationalizes the data set with the following property: for each t ∈ T ,t h e r e
exists an open neighborhood of
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I, O
³¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
´
,s u c ht h a t :
N
³¡£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
∩ O
³¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
´
=
n¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
o
Proof. For each i ∈ I,l e tT i be deﬁned using algorithm 1 and deﬁne
εi =m i n
t,t0∈T i:t6=t0
©° °a∗
−i,t − a∗
−i,t0
° °ª
Since #T i 6 T<∞ and ∀t,t0 ∈ T i, t 6= t0, a∗
−i,t 6= a∗
−i,t0, it follows that εi > 0.
Let εi ∈ (0,εi) and deﬁne the set
Ci =
Ã
[
t∈T i
B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
!
∩ A−i
and the function φ
i : Ci −→ Ai by
φ
i (a−i)=m i n
(
Arg max
ai∈{a∗
i,t}t∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
³³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t0
¢2´¶)
I ﬁrst show that
¡
∀t ∈ T i¢³
∀a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
∩ A−i
´
: φ
i (a−i)=a∗
i,t
To see this, let t ∈ T i be ﬁxed and ﬁx a−i in the relevant subset of A−i.
Consider, for each ai ∈
©
a∗
i,t00
ª
t00∈T i,t h ep r o b l e m
min
t0∈T i
³³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t0
¢2´
18By deﬁnition of εi,17
¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\{t}
¢
:
° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° >
εi
2
whereas ° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° 6
εi
2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
³³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t0
¢2´
=
³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t
¢2
and hence that
Arg max
ai∈
n
a∗
i,t00
o
t00∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
³³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t0
¢2´¶
=
©
a∗
i,t
ª
and that φ
i (a−i)=a∗
i,t.
Also, notice that ∀t,t0 ∈ T i, t 6= t0,
B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
∩ B εi
2
³
a∗
−i,t0
´
= ∅
from where it follows that φ
i is continuous. Since this function is also bounded,
then, by Tietze’s extension theorem, there exists Φi : A−i −→ Ai, continuous,
such that ¡
∀a−i ∈ Ci¢
: Φi (a−i)=φ
i (a−i)
Deﬁne now Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R by
Ui (ai,a −i)=−
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
Clearly, Ui is continuous.
I now have to show that, so deﬁned,
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set.
It is immediate that ∀a−i ∈ A−i, the function Ui (·,a −i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave. In order to show that
(∀t ∈ T ):
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
³¡£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
17This follows by triangle inequality: if for some t0 ∈ Ti\{t},
° ° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° ° 6
εi
2 ,t h e n
° ° °a∗
−i,t − a∗
−i,t0
° ° ° =
° ° °a∗
−i,t − ai + ai − a∗
−i,t0
° ° °
6
° °a∗
−i,t − ai
° ° +
° ° °ai − a∗
−i,t0
° ° °
6
εi
2
+
εi
2
= εi
< εi
a contradiction.
19let i ∈ I and t ∈ T and deﬁne Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T|a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
. As before, one of
the following three mutually exclusive cases must hold:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0,ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0∈(ai,t0,ai,t0)
a∗
i,t0
!
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, therefore
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
from where, if t0
t = t,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Alternatively, suppose that t ∈ T\{ t0
t}.
If a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗
i,t0
t < ai,t and a∗
i,t < ai,t0
t,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t and a∗
i,t >a i,t0
t. Then, by condition (1),
a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, and, therefore,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗
i,t
whereas if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t 6
ai,t,t h e na∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t and contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (ii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t,
ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and,
20therefore, by condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
(iii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t, ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t >a ∗
i,t,t h e n
ai,t = a∗
i,t
<a i,t0
t
<a ∗
i,t0
t
< ai,t
which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) ﬁnally, if ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
and ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t imply by condition (3) that a∗
i,t = ai,t,w h i c hc o n -
tradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t >a i,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fa∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e n
a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t imply, by condition (2), that a∗
i,t = ai,t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t > a∗
i,t,
then a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
and a∗
i,t 6 ai,t0
t imply, by condition (3), that a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (iii) ﬁnally, if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t
and ai,t0
t <a ∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t = ai,t
<a ∗
i,t0
= a∗
i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0=ai,t0
a∗
i,t0
!
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, therefore,
Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
21from where, if t0
t = t,
a∗
i,t, =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Now, suppose that t ∈ T\{ t0
t}.
If ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Alternatively, ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, from where, by construction, a∗
i,t = ai,t.T h e r ea r e
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t < ai,t0
t,
which is a contradiction, because a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t; (ii) if ai,t0
t <a i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e n
ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t and ai,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t, which implies, by
condition (1), that a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t and hence that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
(iii) if a∗
i,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗
i,t0
¶
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, therefore
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
Since a∗
i,t = ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t, it follows that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
This implies that
(∀t ∈ T ):
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
³¡£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
22Let
ε =m i n
i∈I
εi
Since I<∞, it follows that ε>0.D e ﬁne for each t ∈ T
O
³¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
´
= B ε
2
³¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
´
Let t ∈ T . All that remains to be shown now is that if
(ai)i∈I ∈
Ã
O
³¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
´
∩
Y
i∈I
Ai
!-n¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I
o
then
(ai)i∈I / ∈ N
³¡£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
To see this, notice that if (ai)i∈I 6=
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I,t h e nf o rs o m ei ∈ I, ai 6= a∗
i,t.
Fix one such i.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
° ° °(aj)j∈I −
¡
a∗
j,t
¢
j∈I
° ° ° <
ε
2
6
εi
2
so that ° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° <
εi
2
Consider ﬁrst the case t ∈ T i. Clearly,18
¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\{t}
¢
:
° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° >
εi
2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
³³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t0
¢2´
=
³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° −
εi
2
´¡
ai − a∗
i,t
¢2
and, since a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
, that Φi (a−i)=φ
i (a−i)=a∗
i,t and hence that
Ui (ai,a −i)=−
¡
ai − a∗
i,t
¢2
< 0
= −
¡
a∗
i,t − a∗
i,t
¢2
= Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a −i
¢
so that
ai / ∈ Arg max
b ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui (b ai,a −i)
and
(ai)i∈I / ∈ N
³¡£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
18See footnote 17.
23If, on the other hand, t ∈ T\ Ti, then, as before, if Γi,t =
©
t0 ∈ T|a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
,
one of the following cases holds:
Case 1: (∃t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 ∈
¡
ai,t0,ai,t0
¢
Case 2:
¡
(∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0 ∨ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
∧
¡
(∃0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
¢
Case 3: (∀t0 ∈ Γi,t):a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Suppose that case 1 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0∈(ai,t0,ai,t0)
a∗
i,t0
!
By construction, t0
t ∈ T , a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
Φi ¡
a∗
−i
¢
= Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
If a∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¢
, then by, condition (2), a∗
i,t0
t < ai,t and a∗
i,t < ai,t0
t,
whereas, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t and a∗
i,t >a i,t0
t. Then, by condition (1),
a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, and, therefore,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
On the other hand, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t it is obvious that
arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
= ai,t
= a∗
i,t
whereas if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, there are four possibilities: (i) if ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t 6
ai,t,t h e na∗
i,t ∈
¡
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t, which implies, by condition (2), that
a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t and contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (ii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t,
ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t 6 a∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and,
therefore, by condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
24(iii) If ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t, ai,t0
t > ai,t and ai,t0
t >a ∗
i,t,t h e n
ai,t = a∗
i,t
<a i,t0
t
<a ∗
i,t0
t
< ai,t
which is an obvious contradiction; (iv) ﬁnally, if ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
and ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t imply by condition (3) that a∗
i,t = ai,t,w h i c hc o n -
tradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t >a i,t.
Finally, suppose that a∗
i,t = ai,t.I fa∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t it is obvious that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
whereas if a∗
i,t0
t >a i,t, there are three possibilities: (i) if ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e n
a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t imply, by condition (2), that a∗
i,t = ai,t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t = ai,t < ai,t, (ii) if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t and ai,t0
t > a∗
i,t,
then a∗
i,t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¢
and a∗
i,t 6 ai,t0
t imply, by condition (3), that a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t,
which contradicts the fact that a∗
i,t0
t ∈
³
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
´
; (iii) ﬁnally, if ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t
and ai,t0
t <a ∗
i,t,t h e na∗
i,t0
t ∈
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
and a∗
i,t ∈
h
ai,t0
t,ai,t0
t
i
and, therefore, by
condition (1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t, which implies that
a∗
i,t = ai,t
<a ∗
i,t0
= a∗
i,t
which is an obvious contradiction.
At any rate, it follows that
ai / ∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Suppose now that case 2 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
Ã
Arg max
t0∈Γi,t:a∗
i,t0=ai,t0
a∗
i,t0
!
By construction, t0
t ∈ T , a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
Φi (a−i)=Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
25If ai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t = ai,t, whereas by construction
ai,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Alternatively, ai,t >a ∗
i,t0
t, from where, by construction, a∗
i,t = ai,t.T h e r ea r e
three possibilities: (i) If ai,t 6 ai,t0
t, then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t < ai,t0
t,
which is a contradiction; (ii) if ai,t0
t <a i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t,t h e nai,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t 6 ai,t and
ai,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t 6 a∗
i,t0
t = ai,t0
t, which implies, by condition (1), that a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t
and hence that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈Ai Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
=a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
(iii) if a∗
i,t0
t <a i,t = a∗
i,t, then, by construction,
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
At any rate,
a−i / ∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that case 3 holds. Let
t0
t =m i n
µ
Arg min
t0∈Γi,t
a∗
i,t0
¶
By construction, t0
t ∈ T , a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t and, since a−i ∈ B εi
2
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
Φi ¡
a∗
−i
¢
= Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= φ
i
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= a∗
i,t0
t
Since a∗
i,t = ai,t > a∗
i,t0
t, it follows that
a∗
i,t =a r g m a x
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
and, therefore
a−i / ∈ Arg max
ai∈[ai,t,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a∗
−i,t
¢
26It follows directly from theorem 1 that the conditions of theorem 2 are also
necessary for this stronger version of rationalizability that requires local unique-
ness. What theorem 2 implies, then, is that, from an empirical perspective, these
two versions of the Nash-behavior hypothesis are indistinguishable. Put another
way, in the context assumed here, the hypothesis of determinacy of Nash equi-
libria is unfalsiﬁable: given a data set that is Nash-rationalizable, one can never
rule out the possibility that the observed equilibria are locally unique.
3.3 Harshness of the restrictions:
Following the Popperian method, the derivation of the testable implications of
a theory ought to be followed by an assessment of how harsh these implications
are. A harsh test is one that the researcher, before observing the data, would
expect the theory to fail. Simple observation of the conditions of theorem 1
reveals that they are extremely mild. The three of them apply, individual-wise
and for pairs of observations, conditionally on all the other players keeping their
actions unchanged. Now, suppose that there are two players who choose their
actions a∗
i randomly, uniformly over
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
, which is never a singleton set.
In this case, the probability that for some i ∈ I,t h e r ee x i s tt,t0 ∈ T such that
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0 is zero. With all likelihood, one should expect the hypothesis of
Nash behavior to pass the test of theorem 1, notwithstanding the fact that it is
false.
Formally, this comes from the following straightforward corollary of theorem
1:
Corollary 1 Given a data set
³¡
a∗
i,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
if for each t,t0 ∈ T such that t 6= t0,t h e r ee x i s ti0,i 00 ∈ I such that
i0 6= i00
a∗
i0,t 6= a∗
i0,t0
a∗
i00,t 6= a∗
i00,t0
then, the data set is Nash-rationalizable.
Proof. Fix i ∈ I and t,t0 ∈ T .S i n c e∃i0,i 00 ∈ I such that
i0 6= i00
a∗
i0,t 6= a∗
i0,t0
a∗
i00,t 6= a∗
i00,t0
then a∗
−i,t 6= a∗
−i,t0. Since this is true ∀i ∈ I and ∀t,t0 ∈ T , then, by theorem 1,
the data set is Nash-rationalizable.
27In an informal sense, the implication of this corollary is that the restrictions
of theorem 1 have “zero measure” and hence, even before observing any data,
researchers should expect the test to be passed. Given this result, the suﬃ-
ciency of the conditions of theorem 1 becomes crucial: even an exhaustive list
of empirical restrictions of Nash behavior fails to constitute a harsh test of its
principles. Moreover, it follows from theorem 2, that requiring local uniqueness
of equilibria will not change this conclusion.
It is in this sense that I sustained in section 2 that the criticism of the
Nash solution for its extreme informational assumptions appears less severe in
this context. Even under the strong presumption that each player foresees the
actions of his opponents with perfect accuracy, one will almost always fail to
reject the hypothesis of Nash behavior. From an empirical point of view, one
could almost never reject such a hypothesis of perfect accuracy. Hence, only
upon rejection of the hypothesis would one need to explore explanations of the
observed behavior based on beliefs, and not only on preferences.
4 Cooperative behavior:
Another point of the Popperian postulate is the comparison of theories with dis-
tinguished alternative theories, in order to asses their relative predictive abilities.
The most prominent alternative behavioral assumption is that of cooperative
behavior by agents, which in its most basic form would assume that individuals
cooperate so as to obtain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes. I now study the testable
implications of the Pareto solution in the context developed in the previous
section.
As in noncooperative behavior, I want to study conditions under which
the observed data set may be the result of cooperative behavior, in which
for each observation t ∈ T agents jointly choose a Pareto-eﬃcient outcome, ¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I, according to their preferences, from the collectively feasible domain
Q
i∈I
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
. I again propose a weak deﬁnition of rationalizability, which re-
quires that each observed outcome be Pareto-eﬃcient, but does not impose that
it be the only Pareto-eﬃcient outcome, nor does it presume that all the Pareto
sets of the observed feasible sets have been captured by the ﬁnite data set. The
risk of trivial results arises again: if individuals are indiﬀerent between all out-
comes of the games, or if one can assume that there exists at least two players
who are global antagonist, in the sense that for any domain an improvement for
one of them means that the other one is worse oﬀ, then any data set is rational-
izable. Once again, these possibilities are excluded via a concavity assumption
that restricts the class of preferences allowed in the rationalizations.
Before the actual deﬁnition of Pareto-rationalizability, the following notation
needs to be introduced: given a set I of players, each of whom has a set Bi of
feasible actions and preferences represented by
V i :
Y
j∈I
Bj −→ R
28let P
³¡
Bi,Vi¢
i∈I
´
r e p r e s e n tt h es e to fP a r e t o - e ﬃcient outcomes of the game
¡
Bi,Vi¢
i∈I.
With this, the data sets that are considered consistent with cooperative
behavior are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 3 Ad a t as e t
³¡
ai,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is (nontrivially, weakly) Pareto-rationalizable if for each i ∈ I there exists Ui : Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R,d i ﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T ):( ai,t)i∈I ∈ P
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
In this case, it is said that
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Pareto-rationalizes the data.
For notational simplicity, throughout this section I do not distinguish the
actions of each agent from those of his opponents. The obvious reason is that
in the case of Pareto-eﬃcient decisions, all variables are treated equivalently by
the players (the ordinal eﬀect of a−i on Ui does matter). What is conceptu-
ally important is that for this same reason I am restricting the class of utility
functions allowed for rationalization to a strict subset of the class allowed for
noncooperative behavior, which only required strong concavity with respect to
own actions. In that sense, I am using a stronger criterion of rationalizability
for the hypothesis of cooperation. However, as the following results show, not
even under this stronger criterion is cooperative behavior falsiﬁable.
In the following result, I ignore conjunctional constraints, and study the
Pareto set over the whole collective domain.
Theorem 3 For any ﬁnite subset {at}
T
t=1 of
Q
i∈I
Ai,t h e r ee x i s t s
¡
Ui¢
i∈I such
that for each i ∈ I, Ui :
Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R is diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, and
{at}
T
t=1 ⊆ P
³¡
Ai,Ui¢
i∈I
´
Proof. Assume, without loss of generality, that for each i ∈ I, ai =0(and
ai > 0). It follows from lemma 1 in appendix 7 that there exists v ∈ RI
++ such
that for each t,t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0,i ti st r u et h a tv · at 6= v · at0.F i xo n es u c hv ∈ RI
and deﬁne, for each t ∈ T , Vt = v · at. Clearly,
(∀t,t0 ∈ T ):t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0
Consider the sequence (at,v)
T
t=1. I now show that this sequence satisﬁes
condition 3 (see appendix 8.) Let N 6 T and {τ1,...,τN} ⊆ T .S u p p o s e
that ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}
v ·
¡
aτn+1 − aτn
¢
6 0
29Then, by transitivity
VτN 6 Vτ1
and, since ∀t,t0 ∈ T : t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0,w eh a v et h a ti faτN 6= aτ1,t h e n
VτN <V τ1
which implies that
v · (aτN − aτ1) < 0
which implies that condition 2 is satisﬁed. In this case, condition 3 is immediate.
Since v ∈ RI
++, by theorem 6 in appendix 8, there exists a function V + : Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R, continuously diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V + (a) >V+ (at)= ⇒ v · a>v· at
and,
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: v · a<v· at =⇒ V + (a) <V+ (at)
On the other hand, consider the sequence
¡
a − at,v
¢T
t=1,w h e r ea =
¡
ai
¢
i∈I.
I now show that this sequence also satisﬁes condition 3. As before, let N 6 T
and {τ1,...,τN} ⊆ T . Suppose that ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}
v ·
¡¡
a − aτn+1
¢
−
¡
a − aτn
¢¢
6 0
Then, ∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}
v ·
¡
aτn+1 − aτn
¢
> 0
and, by transitivity,
VτN > Vτ1
Hence, since ∀t,t0 ∈ T : t 6= t0 =⇒ Vt 6= Vt0,w eh a v et h a ti faτN 6= aτ1,t h e n
VτN >V τ1
which implies that
v · (aτN − aτ1) > 0
and that
v ·
¡¡
a − aτN
¢
−
¡
a − aτ1
¢¢
< 0
which implies that condition 2 is satisﬁed. Again, condition 3 is here immediate.
Since v ∈ RI
++, it follows once again from theorem 6, that there exists a
function V − :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R,d i ﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V − (a) >V− ¡
a − at
¢
=⇒ v · a>v·
¡
a − at
¢
30and
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: v · a<v·
¡
a − at
¢
=⇒ V − (a) <V− ¡
a − at
¢
Now, since I > 2, it follows that I\{I} 6= ∅ and, then, for each i ∈ I\{I},
one can deﬁne Ui :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→ R,a sUi (a)=V + (a), and deﬁne UI :
Q
i∈I
Ai −→
R,a sUI (a)=V − ¡
a − a
¢
.T h a t ∀i ∈ I{ I}, Ui is diﬀerentiable and strongly
concave is obvious, whereas UI is diﬀerentiable since so are V − and the mapping
a 7−→ a − a, and is strongly concave since so is V − while a 7−→ a − a is aﬃne.
I ﬁnally show that
{at}
T
t=1 ⊆ P
³¡
Ai,Ui¢
i∈I
´
Fix t ∈ T .S u p p o s e t h a t a ∈
Q
i∈I
Ai is such that for i ∈ I\{I} we have
Ui (a) >U i (at).T h e nV + (a) >V+ (at),s ot h a tv · a>v· at and, therefore,
v ·
¡
a − a
¢
<v·
¡
a − at
¢
,s ot h a tV − ¡
a − a
¢
<V − ¡
a − at
¢
and UI (a) <
UI (at).I f , o n t h e o t h e r h a n d a ∈
Q
i∈I
Ai satisﬁes that UI (a) >U I (at),t h e n
V − ¡
a − a
¢
>V − ¡
a − at
¢
,s ot h a tv ·
¡
a − a
¢
>v·
¡
a − at
¢
and, therefore,
v · a<v· at, from where V + (a) <V + (at), implying that for all i ∈ I\{I},
Ui (a) <U i (at).
What the previous proof does is to make player I antagonist to all the rest of
the players at each at. This does not trivialize the result, because the antagonism
does not occur globally, but only locally: global antagonists could not all have
strongly concave utility functions.19 The theorem applies more generally than
the present context, as it holds for any number of players (greater than or equal
to two) and any number of dimensions in the collective domain (that is, it does
not require that the number of players and the number of dimensions be the
same).
In the case dealt with here, where there may be constraints to choice, the
implication is that the hypothesis of Pareto behavior is unfalsiﬁable, as implied
by the following corollary:
Corollary 2 Any data set
³¡
ai,t,a i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Pareto-rationalizable.
Proof. By theorem 3, for each i ∈ I there exists, Ui :
Q
j∈I
Aj −→ R diﬀeren-
tiable and strongly concave, such that
T [
t=1
{at} ⊆ P
³¡
Ai,Ui¢
i∈I
´
19Of course, I could not have made the argument if I were also requiring monotonicity.
31Fix t ∈ T . Then,
at ∈ P
³¡
Ai,Ui¢
i∈I
´
⊆ P
µ³£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
,Ui
at,at
´
i∈I
¶
because
at ∈
Y
i∈I
£
ai,t,ai,t
¤
⊆
Y
i∈I
Ai
This result is interesting by itself, since it implies the unfalsiﬁability of a
noticeable behavioral hypothesis in economics and in game theory.20 Regarding
the main focus of this paper, its implication is that the empirical restrictions
of Nash behavior derived in section 3 are weak in yet another sense: not only
are they extremely mild, but, also, they are weak in that whenever a data set
passes the test, there is no way to rule out the possibility that it is coming
from a totally diﬀerent behavior by agents, namely that they are cooperating
to obtain Pareto-eﬃcient outcomes.
5 Further and stronger restrictions under non-
cooperative behavior:
In view of the results of section 3, regarding the lack of predictive power of
the Nash hypothesis, I now study whether further assumptions yield further or
stronger testable restrictions.
Speciﬁcally, a reasonable criticism to the results of section 3 is that my
deﬁnition of Nash-rationalizability imposes little structure regarding how a−i
enters Ui (only continuity) and that, therefore, in many speciﬁcc a s e ss u c h
deﬁnition is inappropriate in the sense that the class of utility functions that it
allows is too large. The reason why such a large class of preferences was used in
section 3 is that it covers a large class of games. If one has theoretical reasons
to impose other assumptions that reduce the class of preferences to be allowed,
the question then arises of whether the restrictions of theorem 1 (or 2), which
will of course remain necessary under subclasses of the original class, are all the
restrictions of the theory. I now explorep o s s i b l ec a s e sw h e n ,i n d e e d ,f u r t h e r
and stronger testable implications exist.
20The result stands in contrast with the one in Chiappori (1988). As I have pointed out,
however, Chiappori requires monotonicity in the utility functions, and has feasible sets in
which there is trade-oﬀ between the player’s actions. Because the context here does not have
the second property, and because in its absence imposing monotonicity would trivialize the
Nash-rationalizability problem, I have chosen not to impose any monotonicity requirement.
32For the sake of simplicity, I henceforth assume that the following condition
holds:
Condition 1 For each i ∈ I and each t ∈ T , ai = ai,t =0 .
Under this assumption, one can redeﬁne a data set as:
Deﬁnition 4 Ad a t as e ti saﬁnite sequence
³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
such that:
(∀t ∈ T )(∀i ∈ I):
¡
0 < ai,t 6 ai ∧ a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t]
¢
And then, the following corollary to theorem 1 is straightforward:
Corollary 3 A data set ³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable if, and only if, for all t,t0 ∈ T and all i ∈ I :
1.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
2.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0]
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. It suﬃces to show that conditions (1) and (2) here are equivalent to
the restrictions of theorem 1, which, under condition 1, become: ∀t,t0 ∈ T and
∀i ∈ I:
(i):
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
(ii):
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈ (0,ai,t]
a∗
i,t > ai,t0



=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
(iii):
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t =0
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t0 =0
Hence, suppose ﬁrst that condition (1) and (2) here are satisﬁed. Condition
(i) is immediate from 1.
33For condition (ii), suppose that for some t,t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I: a∗
−i,t =
a∗
−i,t0, a∗
i,t ∈ (0,ai,t] and a∗
i,t > ai,t0.I f a∗
i,t > ai,t0, then, by condition (2),
a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0.E l s e ,a∗
i,t = ai,t0, which implies that a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0].I fa∗
i,t0 > ai,t,
then
ai,t0 = a∗
i,t
6 ai,t
<a ∗
i,t0
6 ai,t0
an obvious contradiction. Hence, it must be that a∗
i,t0 6 ai,t,i nw h i c hc a s e
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t] and, therefore, by condition (1),
a∗
i,t0 = a∗
i,t
= ai,t0
For condition (iii), suppose that for some t,t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I: a∗
−i,t =
a∗
−i,t0 and a∗
i,t =0 .I f a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t], then, by condition (1), a∗
i,t0 =0 .E l s e ,
a∗
i,t0 > ai,t, which implies, by condition (2), that a∗
i,t = ai,t > 0,w h i c hi sa
contradiction.
Now, suppose that conditions (i), (ii) and (iii) are satisﬁed. Condition (1) is
immediate from (i).
For condition (2), suppose that for some t,t0 ∈ T and some i ∈ I, a∗
−i,t =
a∗
−i,t0, a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0]. Then, a∗
i,t > ai,t0 > 0, which implies that a∗
i,t ∈ (0,ai,t]
and a∗
i,t > ai,t0, and, therefore, by condition (ii) a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0.
Again, condition (1) is a restatement of the Weak Axiom of Revealed Pref-
erences,21 which must hold for each individual, conditional on the other players
keeping their actions and, therefore, the preferences of the particular individual
unchanged. Condition (2) is now an axiom of revealed increasing monotonicity.
5.1 Further testable restrictions:
As a ﬁrst direction to reduce the class of preferences allowed by the deﬁnitions of
Nash-rationalizability, one may want to restrict the speciﬁc way in which actions
by others aﬀect individual best responses. Speciﬁcally, for the purposes of this
subsection, suppose that there are only two players, so that I = {1,2}. Under
some preferences for player i ∈ I, actions by his opponent, j, are complementary
(to his own) if whenever j increases the value of his choice, the marginal utility
that i derives from his own action increases. If, on the contrary, this marginal
utility decreases, then the actions of player j are substitutes for those of i,f r o m
the point of view of i.
Formally, suppose that for player i ∈ I, Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R satisﬁes that
for each a−i ∈ A−i, U (·,a −i) is diﬀerentiable. Then,
21Which in this case suﬃces for the Strong Axiom of Revealed Preferences.
34Deﬁnition 5 For i ∈ I, a utility function Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R is said to
exhibit strategic complementarity on S ⊆ A−i,w h e r eS is an interval, if for all
a−i,a 0
−i ∈ S,
a−i 6 a0
−i =⇒
¡
∀ai ∈ Ai¢
:
∂Ui
∂ai
(ai,a −i) 6
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
ai,a 0
−i
¢
Deﬁnition 6 For i ∈ I, a utility function Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R is said to
exhibit strategic substitutability on S ⊆ A−i,w h e r eS is an interval, if for all
a−i,a 0
−i ∈ S,
a−i 6 a0
−i =⇒
¡
∀ai ∈ Ai¢
:
∂Ui
∂ai
(ai,a −i) >
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
ai,a 0
−i
¢
Suppose also that one has ap r i o r itheoretical knowledge to imply, for ex-
ample, that for each player the actions of his opponent are complementary on
[0,e a−i] ⊆
£
0,a−i
¤
, and substitute on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
. Then, besides the restrictions
of corollary 3, these two new hypotheses can be tested, and all the restrictions
of Nash behavior in this new context are implied by the following result:
Theorem 4 For each i ∈ I,l e te ai ∈ Ai be given. Let the data set
³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
be given. There exists
¡
Ui¢
i∈I that Nash-rationalizes the data set, such that
for each i ∈ I, Ui exhibits strategic complementarity on [0,e a−i] and strategic
substitutability on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
if, and only if, for each t,t0 ∈ T and each i ∈ I :
1.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
2.
a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0]
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
3.
a∗
−i,t ∈ [0,e a−i]
a∗
−i,t0 6 a∗
−i,t
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t ∈
£
min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª
,ai,t
¤
4.
a∗
−i,t ∈
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
a∗
−i,t0 > a∗
−i,t
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t ∈
£
min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª
,ai,t
¤
35Proof. Necessity: Fix i ∈ I. That conditions (1) and (2) are necessary
follows from corollary 3. For condition (3), suppose that for some t,t0 ∈ T we
have that a∗
−i,t ∈ [0,e a−i] and a∗
i,t0 6 a∗
−i,t,y e ta∗
i,t < min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª
.B yN a s h
rationalizability,
a∗
i,t ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
and then, by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, since a∗
i,t < ai,t,i tm u s tb et r u et h a t
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
6 0
Now, since Ui exhibits strategic complementarity on [0,e a−i] and a∗
−i,t0 6 a∗
−i,t 6
e a−i,
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
6 0
and, since Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
is strongly concave and a∗
i,t <a ∗
i,t0, it follows that
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
< 0
which implies, again by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, and since
a∗
i,t0 ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t0]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
that a∗
i,t0 =0 , and hence that
£
0,a ∗
i,t0
¢
= ∅, contradicting the assumption that
a∗
i,t ∈
£
0,min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª¢
⊆
£
0,a ∗
i,t0
¢
Similarly for condition (4). Suppose that for some t,t0 ∈ T we have that
a∗
−i,t ∈
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
and a∗
−i,t0 > a∗
−i,t,y e ta∗
i,t < min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª
.B y N a s h
rationalizability,
a∗
i,t ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
and then, by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, since a∗
i,t < ai,t,i tm u s tb et r u et h a t
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
6 0
and then, since Ui exhibits strategic substitutability on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
and a∗
i,t0 >
a∗
−i,t > e a−i,
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
6 0
and, since Ui ¡
·,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
is strongly concave and a∗
i,t <a ∗
i,t0,
∂Ui
∂ai
¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
< 0
36which implies, again by the Kühn-Tucker theorem, and since
a∗
i,t0 ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t0]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
that a∗
i,t0 =0 , and hence that
£
0,a ∗
i,t0
¢
= ∅, contradicting the assumption that
a∗
i,t ∈
£
0,min
©
ai,t,a ∗
i,t0
ª¢
⊆
£
0,a ∗
i,t0
¢
Suﬃciency: Fix i ∈ I.C o n s t r u c tT i as follows:
• τi
1 = {1}
• For t ∈ {2,...,T},
τi
t =

  
  
∅ if (∃t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}):



a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]
{t} otherwise
•T i
0 =
T S
t=1
τi
t
•T i
1 =
©
t ∈ T i
0
¯ ¯¡
∃t0 ∈ T i
0\{t}
¢
: a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
•T i
2 =
©
t ∈ T i
1
¯ ¯¡
∀t0 ∈ T i
1 : a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
¢
: ai,t0 6 ai,t
ª
•T i =
¡
T i
0\T i
1
¢
∪ T i
2
It follows by construction that if t ∈ T i
0\T i
1,t h e n
¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\{t}
¢
: a∗
−i,t0 6= a∗
−i,t
since T i ⊆ T i
0.M o r e o v e r , i f t,t0 ∈ T i
2, t 6= t0,a n da∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0, then, by
deﬁnition, a−i,t = a−i,t0, which implies that a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0] and a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t].
But this is impossible since, assuming without loss of generality that t<t 0,
then τi
t0 = ∅ and t0 / ∈ T i
0.22 Therefore,
¡
∀t,t0 ∈ T i : t 6= t0¢
: a∗
−i,t 6= a∗
−i,t0
Reorder T i as ©
ti
1,t i
2,...,t i
T i
ª
22This shows the meaning of the set T i
0: it contains the indices of the observations that
are non-redundant from the point of view of agent i, since he does not care about a−i. T i is
the set that contains the indices of all the observations that are relevant for i and contain the
most information, in terms of revealed preferences, because they have the largest domains.
37where T i =# T i,s o t h a t
¡
∀n ∈
©
1,...,T i − 1
ª¢
: a∗
−i,ti
n <a ∗
−i,ti
n+1
I will consider only the case when a∗
−i,ti
1 6 e a−i 6 a∗
−i,ti
Ti, since the other cases
derive easily from this one. Construct the mapping
ϑ
i :


T i [
n=1
n
a∗
−i,ti
n
o

 ∪ {e a−i} −→ Ai
(recursively) as follows:
• ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
1
´
= a∗
i,ti
1
• ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
Ti
´
= a∗
i,ti
Ti
• For n>1 such that a∗
−i,ti
n ∈ [0,e a−i),
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
=m a x
½
max
n0<n
n
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n0
´o
,a ∗
i,ti
n
¾
• For n<Ti such that a∗
−i,ti
n ∈
¡
e a−i,a−i
¤
,
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
=m a x
½
max
n0>n
n
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n0
´o
,a ∗
i,ti
n
¾
• For 1 <n<Ti such that a∗
−i,ti
n = e a−i,
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
=m a x
½
max
n06=n
n
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n0
´o
,a ∗
i,ti
n
¾
• ϑ
i (e a−i)=m a x n
n
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´o
.
This mapping is single-valued and has the property that, for each n,n0 ∈ ©
1,...,T iª
,
a∗
−i,ti
n ∈ [0,e a−i]
a∗
−i,ti
n0 6 a∗
−i,ti
n
)
=⇒ ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n0
´
6 ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
a∗
−i,ti
n ∈
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
a∗
−i,ti
n0 > a∗
−i,ti
n
)
=⇒ ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n0
´
6 ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
n
´
6 ϑ
i (e a−i)
38Let li ⊆ A−i ×Ai be the linear interpolation of the following ﬁnite sequence
on R2,
n³
0,ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
1
´´
,
³
a∗
−i,ti
1,ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
1
´´
,...,
¡
e a−i,ϑ
i (e a−i)
¢
,
...,
³
a∗
−i,ti
Ti,ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
Ti
´´
,
³
a−i,ϑ
i
³
a∗
−i,ti
Ti
´´o
the ﬁrst components of whose elements are ordered increasingly. Let Φi :
A−i −→ Ai be the function whose graph is li. This function is well deﬁned,
since
0 6 a∗
−i,ti
1 6 e a−i 6 a∗
−i,ti
Ti 6 a−i
and ϑ
i is single-valued. Moreover, Φi has the following properties: it is contin-
uous, nondecreasing on [0,e a−i] and nonincreasing on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
,a n df o re a c h
t ∈ T i, Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
> a∗
i,t.
Deﬁne the function Ui : Ai × A−i −→ R by
Ui (ai,a −i)=−
¡
ai − Φi (a−i)
¢2
In o ws h o wt h a t
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. It is immediate that
for each i ∈ I, Ui is continuous and ∀a−i ∈ A−i, Ui (·,a −i) is diﬀerentiable and
strongly concave. Then, I only need to show that
(∀t ∈ T )(∀i ∈ I):a∗
i,t ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Fix t ∈ T and i ∈ I.
Suppose ﬁrst that t ∈ T i.I f Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= a∗
i,t, the result is obvious. Else,
if a∗
−i,t ∈ [0,e a−i), Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
>a ∗
i,t implies that for some t0 ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0 <a ∗
−i,t
and a∗
i,t0 >a ∗
i,t. Then, by condition (3), a∗
i,t = ai,t < Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
, from where
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
If, on the other hand, a∗
−i,t ∈
¡
e a−i,a−i
¤
, Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
>a ∗
i,t implies that for some
t0 ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0 >a ∗
−i,t and a∗
i,t0 >a ∗
i,t. Then, by condition (4), a∗
i,t = ai,t <
Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
, from where, as before,
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, if a∗
−i,t = e a−i, Φi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
>a ∗
i,t implies that either for some t0 ∈ T i,
a∗
−i,t0 <a ∗
−i,t and a∗
i,t0 >a ∗
i,t or for some t0 ∈ T i, a∗
−i,t0 >a ∗
−i,t and a∗
i,t0 >a ∗
i,t,
and the results follows according to the corresponding previous case.
39Suppose now that t ∈ T i
0\T i = T i
1\T i
2.23 By construction, ∃t0 ∈ T i
1 such
that a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t and ai,t0 > ai,t.L e t
t0
t ∈ Arg max
t0∈T 1
i
©
ai,t0|a∗
−i,t0 = a∗
−i,t
ª
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i
2 ⊆ T i, ai,t0
t > ai,t and a∗
−i,t0
t = a∗
−i,t,s ot h a t∀ai ∈ Ai:
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
= Ui
³
ai,a ∗
−i,t0
t
´
= −
³
ai − Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´´2
whereas a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t] ⊂
£
0,ai,t0
t
¤
,s ot h a ti fa∗
−i,t0
t ∈ [0,ai,t], then, by condition
(1), a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t and, therefore,
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
follows from the previous case. If, alternatively, a∗
−i,t0
t / ∈ [0,ai,t], then, by con-
dition (2), a∗
i,t = ai,t and, since ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t 6 Φi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
, again
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, consider t ∈ T\ Ti
0. Again, ∃t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1} such that a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0,
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0] and a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t].L e t
t0
t =m i n
©
t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}|a∗
−i,t = a∗
−i,t0,a ∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0],a ∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]
ª
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i
0 and then, by the previous two cases, and condition (1),
©
a∗
i,t
ª
=
n
a∗
i,t0
t
o
= Arg max
ai∈
h
0,ai,t0
t
i Ui
³
ai,a ∗
−i,t0
t
´
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
23This, because
T i
0\T i = T i
0\
¡¡
T i
0\T i
1
¢
∪ T i
2
¢
= T i
0 ∩
¡¡
T i
0\T i
1
¢
∪ T i
2
¢c
= T i
0 ∩
³¡
T i
0\T i
1
¢c ∩
¡
T i
2
¢c´
= T i
0 ∩
³³
T i
0 ∩
¡
T i
1
¢c´c
∩
¡
T i
2
¢c´
= T i
0 ∩
³¡
T i
0
¢c ∪ T i
1
´
∩
¡
T i
2
¢c
= T i
1 ∩
¡
T i
2
¢c
= T i
1\T i
2
where all complements are taken relatively to T i
0.
40All that remains to show is that each Ui exhibits strategic complementarity
on [0,e a−i] and strategic substitutability on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
.F i xi ∈ I and a0
i ∈ Ai.
By construction,
∂Ui
∂ai
(a0
i,·)=−2
¡
a0
i − Φi (·)
¢
which is nondecreasing on [0,e a−i] and nonincreasing on
£
e a−i,a−i
¤
.
Hence, when the hypotheses of strategic complementarity and substitutabil-
ity can be plausibly assumed, they strengthen the test of corollary 3, as they can
themselves be tested. It is straightforward to see that the restrictions derived
from these extra assumptions are not “zero measure” and hence the conclusion
of subsection 3.3 does not follow here. It is also simple to see that one can
impose other structures of complementarity and substitutability, in which case
suitably modiﬁed restrictions will arise.
5.2 Stronger testable restrictions:
In the results obtained in section 3, players make very ﬁne distinctions regarding
the actions of their opponents. They do care, for example, for the exact value
of the action of each opponent and treat their opponents distinctly, with careful
consideration for who they are. Although this may be acceptable in many
situations (for example if the actions of others are not physically comparable,
or if one opponent is a good friend, or a partner in a joint venture of one ﬁrm, and
the other opponent is an enemy, or the competitor of the ﬁrm) it may also be too
extreme in other cases: individual actions may be physically comparable, and
players may care about the values of the actions of the opponents, regardless of
the names that those actions have attached (eﬀectively treating their opponents
as mutual substitutes,) or they may care about the actions of only some, or
none, of their opponents, or about just an aggregate of their actions. I now show
that these types of assumptions may yield stronger versions of the conditions of
corollary 3.
5.2.1 Aggregation:
I ﬁrst consider the case in which each individual only cares about his own action
and an aggregate of his opponents choices. I assume for the remainder of this
subsection that ∀i ∈ I, ai = a.D e n o t e A =
£
0,a
¤
and A− =
£
0,a
¤I−1.I
consider general aggregators, which are deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 7 Af u n c t i o nσ : A− −→ S,w h e r eS ⊆ Rn, n ∈ N, is an aggregator
for U : A × A− −→ R if for each ai,a 0
i ∈ A−
σ (ai)=σ (a0
i)= ⇒ (∀a ∈ A):U (a,ai)=U (a,a0
i)
Now, suppose that one has theoretical reasons to assume that each individual
i ∈ I only cares about his own choice, and an aggregate σi of the choices of his
opponents, where σi : A− −→ Si,f o rSi ⊆ Rni, ni ∈ N. Then, the deﬁnition of
Nash-rationalizability must be modiﬁed accordingly.
41Deﬁnition 8 Let σ=
¡
σi : R
I−1
+ −→ Si¢
i∈I be a proﬁle of continuous aggrega-
tors. A data set ³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with σ-aggregation if there exists
¡
Ui¢
i∈I that Nash-
rationalizes it, such that for each i ∈ I, σi is an aggregator for Ui.
Intuition suggests that all the restrictions of Nash behavior in this context
should be modiﬁed versions of the restrictions of corollary 3, strengthened so
that, for each i ∈ I,i ti sn o tt h ep r o ﬁle of actions of i’s opponents, but its
aggregate according to σi that conditions them. The following theorem conﬁrms
this intuition.
Theorem 5 Let σ=
¡
σi : R
I−1
+ −→ Si¢
i∈I be a proﬁle of continuous aggrega-
tors. A data set ³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with σ-aggregation if, and only if, for each t,t0 ∈ T and
each i ∈ I :
1.
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
2.
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0]
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. Necessity: Suppose not. Let
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalize the data, as-
suming that ∀i ∈ I,Ui satisﬁes that
¡
∀ai,a 0
i ∈ A− : σi (ai)=σi (a0
i)
¢
(∀a ∈ A):Ui (a,ai)=Ui (a,a0
i)
Suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t,t0 ∈ T such that σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
, a∗
i,t ∈
[0,ai,t0], a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t] and a∗
i,t 6= a∗
i,t0. Without loss of generality, assume that
Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
6 Ui ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
.S i n c e σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
, the latter im-
plies that Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
6 Ui ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t
¢
.L e t ai = 1
2
¡
a∗
i,t + a∗
i,t0
¢
. Clearly,
ai ∈ [0,ai,t] whereas by strong concavity Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
>U i ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
,c o n -
tradicting the fact that
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data set. This proves
condition (1).
Now, for condition (2), suppose that ∃i ∈ I and ∃t,t0 ∈ T such that
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
, a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0] and a∗
i,t0 < ai,t0. Then, it follows that
ai,t0 < ai,t. Also, since a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t0] ⊂ [0,ai,t], it follows that if
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-
rationalizes the data set, then Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t
¢
> Ui ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t
¢
.M o r e o v e r ,s i n c e
42σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
, the latter implies that Ui ¡
a∗
i,t,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
> Ui ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
and, then, by strong concavity,
(∀λ ∈ (0,1)) : Ui ¡
λa∗
i,t +( 1− λ)a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
>U i ¡
a∗
i,t0,a ∗
−i,t0
¢
whereas for λ close enough to 0, λa∗
i,t+(1− λ)a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t0], contradicting the
fact that
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data.
Suﬃciency:F i xi ∈ I.D e ﬁne the set T i as follows:
• τi
1 = {1}
• For t ∈ {2,...,T},
τi
t =

  
  
∅ if (∃t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}):



σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]
{t} otherwise
•T i
0 =
T S
t=1
τi
t
•T i
1 =
©
t ∈ T i
0
¯ ¯¡
∃t0 ∈ T i
0\{t}
¢
: σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢ª
•T i
2 =
©
t ∈ T i
1
¯ ¯¡
∀t0 ∈ T i
1 : σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢¢
: ai,t0 6 ai,t
ª
•T i =
¡
T i
0\T i
1
¢
∪ T i
2
It follows by construction that if t ∈ T i
0\T i
1,t h e n
¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\{t}
¢
: σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
6= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
since T i ⊆ T i
0.M o r e o v e r , i f t,t0 ∈ T i
2, t 6= t0,a r es u c ht h a tσi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
=
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
, then, by construction, a−i,t = a−i,t0,a n d ,t h e r e f o r ea∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
and a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]. But this is impossible since, assuming without loss of gener-
ality that t<t 0,t h e nτi
t0 = ∅ and t0 / ∈ T i
0. Then, we conclude that
¡
∀t,t0 ∈ T i : t 6= t0¢
: σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
6= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
Deﬁne Ci =
©
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢ª
t∈T i ⊆ σi [A−]. By the previous result, the function
φ
i : Ci −→ A,d e ﬁned by θ
i ¡
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢¢
= a∗
i,t,f o re a c ht ∈ T i,i sw e l ld e ﬁned.24
24By using this function, I am giving up the possibility of ensuring a local uniqueness
result analogous to theorem 2. If such a result is wanted, one can reason as follows: since
#T i 6 T<∞,w eh a v et h a t
εi := min
t,t0∈T i:t6=t0
³° ° °σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
− σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
´° ° °
´
> 0
Fix εi ∈ (0,εi).S i n c eσi is continuous and #T i < ∞, ∃δi ∈ R++ such that
¡
∀t ∈ Ti¢
(∀a−i ∈ A−):
° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° 6 δi =⇒
° °σi (a−i) − σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢° ° <ε i
43Since Ci is closed, and φ
i is (trivially) continuous and bounded, it follows from
Tietze’s extension theorem that there exists a continuous extension of φ
i to the
whole of σi [A−].L e tΦi : σi [A−] −→ A be one such extension.
Deﬁne now Ui : A × A− −→ R by
Ui (ai,a −i)=−
¡
ai − Φi ¡
σi (a−i)
¢¢2
Clearly, Ui is continuous and satisﬁes that
¡
∀ai,a 0
i ∈ A− : σi (ai)=σi (a0
i)
¢
(∀a ∈ A):Ui (a,ai)=Ui (a,a0
i)
I now only have to show that, so deﬁned,
¡
Ui¢
i∈I Nash-rationalizes the data
set. It is immediate that ∀a−i ∈ A−, the function Ui (·,a −i) is diﬀerentiable
and strongly concave. In order to show that
(∀t ∈ T ):
¡
a∗
i,t
¢
i∈I ∈ N
³¡
[0,ai,t],Ui
at
¢
i∈I
´
I have to show that
(∀t ∈ T )(∀i ∈ I):a∗
i,t ∈ Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Hence, ﬁx t ∈ T and i ∈ I.
Deﬁne the set
Ci :=
[
t∈T i
B δi
2
³
a∗
−i,t
´
∩ A−
and the function φi : Ci −→ Ai by
φi (a−i): =m i n

 
 
Arg max
ai∈
n
a∗
i,t
o
t∈T i
µ
min
t0∈T i
µ³° ° °σi (a−i) − σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
´° ° ° −
εi
2
´³
ai − a∗
i,t0
´2¶¶

 
 
One ﬁrst shows that
¡
∀t ∈ T i¢µ
∀a−i ∈ B δi
2
³
a∗
−i,t
´
∩ A−
¶
: φi (a−i)=a∗
i,t
To see this, let t ∈ T i and a−i ∈ B δi
2
³
a∗
−i,t
´
∩ A−. Consider, for each ai ∈
n
a∗
i,t00
o
t00∈T i,
the problem
min
t0∈T i
µ³° ° °σi (a−i) − σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
´° ° ° −
εi
2
´³
ai − a∗
i,t0
´2¶
By construction, deﬁnition of δi and εi and triangle inequality
¡
∀t0 ∈ T i\{t}
¢
:
° ° °σi (a−i) − σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
´° ° ° >
εi
2
whereas ° °σi (a−i) − σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢° ° 6
εi
2
which suﬃces to imply that
min
t0∈T i
µ³° ° °a−i − a∗
−i,t0
° ° ° −
εi
2
´³
ai − a∗
i,t0
´2¶
=
³° °a−i − a∗
−i,t
° ° −
εi
2
´ ¡
ai − a∗
i,t
¢2
and therefore that φi (a−i)=a∗
i,t. From here on, the proof carries on.
44Suppose ﬁrst that t ∈ T i.B yc o n s t r u c t i o n ,
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
= −
¡
ai − Φi ¡
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
¡
ai − φ
i ¡
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
¡
ai − a∗
i,t
¢2
from where the result is obvious.
Secondly, consider t ∈ T i
0\T i = T i
1\T i
2.25 Then, by construction, ∃t0 ∈ T i
1
such that σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
and ai,t0 > ai,t.L e t
t0
t ∈ Arg max
t0∈T 1
i
©
ai,t0|σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢ª
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i
2 ⊆ T i, ai,t0
t > ai,t and σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
,s ot h a t
∀ai ∈ A :
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
= −
¡
ai − Φi ¡
σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢¢¢2
= −
³
ai − Φi
³
σi
³
a∗
−i,t0
t
´´´2
= −
³
ai − a∗
i,t0
t
´2
whereas a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t] ⊂
£
0,ai,t0
t
¤
,s ot h a ti fa∗
i,t0
t ∈ [0,ai,t], then by condition (1)
of the theorem a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
t and, therefore
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
If, alternatively, a∗
i,t0
t / ∈ [0,ai,t], then, by condition (2) of the theorem, a∗
i,t = ai,t
and, since ai,t <a ∗
i,t0
t, again
©
a∗
i,t
ª
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
Finally, suppose that t ∈ T\ Ti
0. Then, by construction, ∃t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}
such that σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
, a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0] and a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t].L e t
t0
t =m i n
©
t0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}|σi ¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= σi ¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
,a ∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0],a ∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]
ª
By construction, t0
t ∈ T i
0 and then, by the previous two cases and condition (1),
©
a∗
i,t
ª
=
n
a∗
i,t0
t
o
= Arg max
ai∈
h
0,ai,t0
t
i Ui
³
ai,a ∗
−i,t0
t
´
= Arg max
ai∈[0,ai,t]
Ui ¡
ai,a ∗
−i,t
¢
25See note 23.
45The importance of this result is that its testable restrictions need not have
“zero measure.” For this, it suﬃces that for some player i ∈ I there exist a
subset of A−, with positive Lebesgue measure, where the image of aggregator
σi is constant. In such a case, the experiment of generating individual choices
randomly, using uniform distributions, no longer generates rationalizable data
sets with probability one. This probability now decreases as the measure of
those level sets of the aggregators increases. The harshness of the test then
depends on the Lebesgue measure of the level sets of the aggregators.
5.2.2 Example: Anonymity
A simple example of aggregation is the following. Consider a game in which
actions taken by all players are physically comparable, and each player i ∈ I
treats the other players anonymously in the sense that if a−i,a 0
−i ∈ A− are
such that the only diﬀerence between the two of them is the order of their
components, then for each a ∈ Ai,p l a y e ri is indiﬀerent between (a,a−i) and ¡
a,a0
−i
¢
.
Deﬁne the set O =
©
b ∈ R
I−1
+
¯ ¯(∀l ∈ {2,...,I − 1}):bl−1 6 bl
ª
,i nw h i c ha l l
the vectors are ordered ascendingly. Let the function o : R
I−1
+ −→ O reorder
t h ee l e m e n t so fv e c t o r si nR
I−1
+ .T h a ti s ,
a 7−→ o(a)=( o1 (a),o 2 (a),...,oI−1 (a))
such that ¡
∀a ∈ R
I−1
+
¢
(∀l ∈ {2,...,I − 1}):ol−1 (a) 6 ol (a)
and
¡
∀a ∈ R
I−1
+
¢
(∀l ∈ {1,...,I − 1})(∃l0 ∈ {1,...,I − 1}):ol (a)=al0
¡
∀a ∈ R
I−1
+
¢
(∀l ∈ {1,...,I − 1})(∃l0 ∈ {1,...,I − 1}):al = ol0 (a)
The idea of anonymity is that what each player cares about is the components
of the vectors of choices of his opponents, regardless of their order. Then, deﬁne:
Deﬁnition 9 Two vectors a−i,a 0
−i ∈ A− are anonymously equivalent if
o(a−i)=o
¡
a0
−i
¢
Consequently, under the Nash hypothesis, individuals behave according to
anonymity if their preferences satisfy the following condition.
Deﬁnition 10 Af u n c t i o nU : A × A− −→ R satisﬁes anonymity if o is an
aggregator for U.
Again, one must modify the deﬁnition of Nash-rationalizability so as to re-
quire that preferences satisfy anonymity. The natural deﬁnition is:
46Deﬁnition 11 Ad a t as e t
³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is Nash-rationalizable with anonymity (NRWA) if there exists
¡
Ui¢
i∈I that Nash-
rationalizes it such that ∀i ∈ I,Ui satisﬁes anonymity.
Given that the function o is continuous,26 the following result follows straight-
forwardly from theorem 5.
Corollary 4 A data set ³¡
a∗
i,t,ai,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
is NRWA if, and only if, ∀t,t0 ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I :
1.
o
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= o
¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
a∗
i,t ∈ [0,ai,t0]
a∗
i,t0 ∈ [0,ai,t]



=⇒ a∗
i,t = a∗
i,t0
2.
o
¡
a∗
−i,t
¢
= o
¡
a∗
−i,t0
¢
a∗
i,t / ∈ [0,ai,t0]
¾
=⇒ a∗
i,t0 = ai,t0
Proof. Let σ=(o : A− −→ O)i∈I.T h i si sap r o ﬁle of continuous aggregators,
and the result then follows from theorem 5
It must be noticed, however, that anonymity does not increase the power of
the test of corollary 3, since all level sets for the anonymous aggregator, o,a r e
ﬁnite and, hence, have zero Lebesgue measure.
5.3 Example: Cournot competition.
As a simple example of a problem in which issues of aggregation and strate-
gic substitutability are present, consider the following (slightly nonstandard)
oligopoly problem. Consider an industry composed by a set I of ﬁrms. Each
ﬁrm has a structural maximal production capacity q.A t t i m e t, ﬁrm i de-
cides how much to produce (q∗
i,t), subject to a short-term capacity constraint
qi ∈
£
0,qi,t
¤
⊆
£
0,q
¤
, taking as given the aggregate production of the rest of the
industry (
P
j∈I\{i} q∗
j,t), so as to solve the problem
max
qi∈[0,qi,t]
πi ¡
qi,q∗
−i,t
¢
26Actually, uniformly continuous: since ∀a,a0 ∈ RI−1
+ ,
PI−1
i=1 oi (a)oi (a0) >
PI−1
i=1 aia0
i,i t
is easy to show that ∀a,a0 ∈ RI−1
+ , ko(a) − o(a0)k 6 ka − a0k. Then, by letting δ = ε it
follows that
(∀ε ∈ R++)(∃δ ∈ R++)
³
∀a ∈ RI−1
+
´³
∀a0 ∈ Bδ (a) ∩ RI−1
+
´
:
° °o(a) − o
¡
a0¢° ° <ε
47where πi : A×A− −→ R is a proﬁt function that satisﬁes the following proper-
ties:27
1. It is continuous,
2. ∀q−i ∈ A−, the function πi (·,q −i):A −→ R is diﬀerentiable and strongly
concave,
3.
¡
∀q−i,q0
−i ∈ A−¢
:
X
j∈I\{i}
qj =
X
j∈I\{i}
q0
j =⇒ (∀q0 ∈ A):πi (q,q−i)=πi ¡
q,q0
−i
¢
4.
¡
∀q−i,q0
−i ∈ A−¢
:
X
j∈I\{i}
qj 6
X
j∈I\{i}
q0
j =⇒ (∀q0 ∈ A):
∂πi
∂qi
(q,q−i) >
∂πi
∂qi
i ¡
q,q0
−i
¢
Ad a t as e ti saﬁnite time series of observed productions and short term
production capacities,
³¡
q∗
i,t,qi,t
¢
i∈I
´T
t=1
. It follows from combining theorems
5 and 4 that there exists a proﬁle of proﬁt functions
¡
πi¢
i∈I such that ∀i ∈
I, πi satisﬁes the above conditions and ∀t ∈ T , (qi,t)i∈I is a Nash-Cournot
equilibrium of the market given capacity constraints
¡
qi,t
¢
i∈I if, and only if,
∀t,t0 ∈ T and ∀i ∈ I,
1. P
j∈I\{i} q∗
j,t =
P
j∈I\{i} q∗
j,t0
q∗
i,t ∈
£
0,qi,t0
¤
q∗
i,t0 ∈
£
0,qi,t
¤



=⇒ q∗
i,t = q∗
i,t0
2. P
j∈I\{i} q∗
j,t =
P
j∈I\{i} q∗
j,t0
q∗
i,t / ∈
£
0,qi,t0
¤
¾
=⇒ q∗
i,t0 = qi,t0
3. X
j∈I\{i}
q∗
j,t 6
X
j∈I\{i}
q∗
j,t0 =⇒ q∗
i,t ∈
£
min
©
qi,t,q∗
i,t0
ª
,qi,t
¤
27This is nonstandard in that I do not require that πi have the usual form
πi (qi,q −i)=d−1


X
j∈I
qj

 qi − ci (qi)
where d : R+ −→ R+ is a demand function and ci : R+ −→ R+ is a cost function.
486C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s :
This paper studied the problem of whether or not the hypothesis that individ-
uals behave as assumed by the concept of Nash equilibrium is falsiﬁable. The
question is relevant since, from an epistemological point of view, the unfalsi-
ﬁability of an idea casts doubts about its character of scientiﬁck n o w l e d g e . I
have considered here the case of a ﬁnite number of players, each of whom is
endowed with a continuous domain, perhaps subject to additional constraints.
In order to increase the empirical applicability of my results, I assumed that
only a ﬁnite data set is observed, and used a weak criterion of rationalizability,
so as to avoid the assumption, whether implicit or explicit, that all the equi-
libria of the games have been collected in the ﬁnite data set. The ﬁrst result
that I obtain is that the hypothesis is in eﬀect falsiﬁable, but that the extra
assumption that equilibria are locally unique cannot be tested. The conditions
that allow for falsiﬁcation are suitably applied versions of the axioms of revealed
preference, which must hold for each individual, conditional on the actions of
his opponents. This conditionality is fairly intuitive, since only under it can
one ensure that the individual is maximizing the same utility function. When
players make very ﬁne distinctions between the actions of their opponents, and
when the ordinal eﬀects of these actions on the payoﬀ function of the individual
are left unrestricted, the testable implications derived from Nash behavior are
seen to be extremely mild. Nonetheless, for the general case, these implications
are all the restrictions that the theory imposes, as it is shown that they are also
suﬃcient conditions for rationalizability.
Then, the question that must be answered before concluding that, for all
practical purposes, it is as if the hypothesis were unfalsiﬁable is whether the
weak requirements for rationalizability, the ﬁnesse with which agents distin-
guish actions of their opponents and the arbitrariness allowed to ordinal eﬀects
are appropriate assumptions in speciﬁc cases. I have chosen to maintain weak
rationalizability requirements, in order to avoid having to defend arguments
that said that in the ﬁnite data set one has indeed observed all the equilibria of
the games over continuous domains. To my mind, a more convenient route to
explore is whether extra assumptions about how the payoﬀs of individuals are
aﬀected by actions of their opponents suﬃce to strengthen the tests of the Nash
hypothesis. My ﬁndings are that, indeed, they may.
7 Appendix: Parallel Hyperplanes.
In this appendix for each i ∈ {1,...,I}, I<∞, ei represents the ith canonical
unit vector in RI.
Lemma 1 For every ﬁnite set {at}
T
t=1 ⊆ RI,t h e r ee x i s t sv ∈ RI
++ such that
for each t,t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0, it is true that v · at 6= v · at0.
Proof. Consider the following algorithm:
49Algorithm 2 Input: {at}
T
t=1
1. v = {1,...,1}, t =1 .
2. If (∀τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}):v · aτ 6= v · at,g ot o4 .
3. Deﬁne
b τ ∈ {τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}|v · aτ = v · at}
b i =m i n{i ∈ {1,...,I}|ai,b τ 6= ai,t}
γ =m a x
½
max
τ∈{1,...,t−1}
n¯ ¯ ¯ab i,τ − ab i,t
¯ ¯ ¯
o
, max
τ,τ0∈{1,...,t−1}
n¯ ¯ ¯ab i,τ − ab i,τ0
¯ ¯ ¯
o¾
If t =2 ,d e ﬁne ε =1 .E l s e ,d e ﬁne
ε =m i n
½
min
τ∈{1,...,t−1}\{b τ}
{|v · aτ − v · at|}, min
τ,τ0∈{1,...,t−1},τ6=τ0 {|v · aτ − v · aτ0|}
¾
Deﬁne
κ =
ε
2γ
v = v + κeb i
4. If t = T,s t o p .E l s e ,t = t +1a n dg ot o2 .
Output: v
Since T<0, it is obvious that the algorithm runs in ﬁnite time. I now show
that the v resulting at the end of the algorithm satisﬁes v ∈ RI
++ and that
∀t,t0 ∈ T , t 6= t0,i ti st r u et h a tv · at 6= v · at0.
Fix t ∈ T . Suppose that before the tth pass through the algorithm, v ∈ RI
++
is such that
(∀τ,τ0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1},τ 6= τ0):v · aτ 6= v · aτ0
which is true when t 6 2.
If at step (2) of the algorithm it is true that ∀τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1} : v·aτ 6= v·at,
then it is obvious from step 4 that before the t+1 st pass through the algorithm
v ∈ RI
++ and
(∀τ,τ0 ∈ {1,...,t},τ 6= τ0):v · aτ 6= v · aτ0
Now, suppose that the condition of step (2) does not hold. Then
(∃τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}):v · aτ = v · at
This τ is obviously unique, and is what is deﬁned as b τ at step (3).
Also, at step (3) it is obvious that ε 6=0if t =2 . Moreover for t > 3,
the fact that ε>0 follows from the uniqueness of b τ and the assumption about
v before the tth pass through the algorithm. That b i is well deﬁned follows
from the fact that b τ 6= t and the deﬁnition of set imply that ab τ 6= at.S i n c e
γ >
¯ ¯ ¯ab i,b τ − ab i,t
¯ ¯ ¯ > 0 it follows that κ>0.
50In order to avoid confusion, deﬁne v∗ = v + κeb i. Obviously, v∗ >v ,s ot h a t
v∗ ∈ RI
++. I now claim that the following three properties are satisﬁed by v∗:
(i)
v∗ · ab τ 6= v∗ · at
(ii)
(∀τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}\{b τ}):v∗ · aτ 6= v∗ · at
(iii)
(∀τ,τ0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1},τ 6= τ0):v∗ · aτ 6= v∗ · aτ0
For the claim (i), just notice that
v∗ · ab τ − v∗ · at = v · ab τ + κab i,b τ − v · at − κab i,t
= κ
³
ab i,b τ − ab i,t
´
6=0
since v · ab τ = v · at, κ>0 and ab i,b τ − ab i,t 6=0 .
If t =2 , claims (ii) and (iii) are trivial. Hence I now assume that t > 3.
Consider ﬁrst claim (ii). Fix τ ∈ {1,...,t − 1}\{b τ}.B yc o n s t r u c t i o nv·aτ 6=
v · at. Suppose ﬁrst that v · aτ <v· at.T h e n
v∗ · aτ − v∗ · at = v · aτ + κab i,τ − v · at − κab i,t
= v · aτ − v · at + κ
³
ab i,τ − ab i,t
´
6 v · aτ − v · at + κ
¯ ¯ ¯ab i,τ − ab i,t
¯ ¯ ¯
6 v · aτ − v · at + κγ
= v · aτ − v · at +
ε
2
≤− ε +
ε
2
= −
ε
2
< 0
w h e r et h es i x t hs t e pf o l l o w ss i n c ev·aτ−v·at = −|v · aτ − v · at| and |v · aτ − v · at| >
ε.
51If, on the other hand, v · at <v· aτ,t h e n
v∗ · at − v∗ · aτ = v · at + κab i,t − v · aτ − κab i,τ
= v · at − v · aτ + κ
³
ab i,t − ab i,τ
´
6 v · at − v · aτ + κ
¯ ¯ ¯ab i,t − ab i,τ
¯ ¯ ¯
6 v · at − v · aτ + κγ
= v · at − v · aτ +
ε
2
≤− ε +
ε
2
= −
ε
2
< 0
w h e r et h es i x t hs t e pf o l l o w ss i n c ev·at−v·aτ = −|v · at − v · aτ| and |v · at − v · aτ| >
ε.
For claim (iii), ﬁx τ,τ0 ∈ {1,...,t − 1}, τ 6= τ0. By assumption about v
before the tth pass through the algorithm, v·aτ 6= v·aτ0, so that we can assume
without loss of generality that v · aτ <v· aτ0.A sb e f o r e ,
v∗ · aτ − v∗ · aτ0 = v · aτ + κab i,τ − v · aτ0 − κab i,τ0
= v · aτ − v · aτ0 + κ
³
ab i,τ − ab i,τ0
´
6 v · aτ − v · aτ0 + κ
¯ ¯ ¯ab i,τ − ab i,τ0
¯ ¯ ¯
6 v · aτ − v · aτ0 + κγ
= v · aτ − v · aτ0 +
ε
2
≤− ε +
ε
2
= −
ε
2
< 0
w h e r et h es i x t hs t e pf o l l o w ss i n c ev · aτ − v · aτ0 = −|v · aτ − v · aτ0| and
|v · aτ − v · aτ0| > ε.
This claims show that before the t +1 st pass through the algorithm
(∀τ,τ0 ∈ {1,...,t},τ 6= τ0):v · aτ 6= v · aτ0
8 Appendix: Construction of strongly concave
preferences.
Let I ∈ N.F o r a ﬁnite sequence (at,v t)
T
t=1,w h e r e(∀t ∈ T ):at ∈ RI
+ and
vt ∈ RI
++,d e ﬁne the following two conditions:
52Condition 2 ∀N 6 T and ∀{τ1,...,τN} ⊆ T ,
¡
(∀n ∈ {1,...,N − 1}):vτn ·
¡
aτn+1 − aτn
¢
6 0
¢
=⇒



aτ1 = aτN
or
vτN · (aτ1 − aτN) > 0
Condition 3 Besides condition 2,
(∀t,t0 ∈ T ):vt 6= vt0 =⇒ at 6= at0
The following theorem is derived from a result in Chiappori and Rochet
(1987), which is obtained in a diﬀerent context, but has the same mathematical
content.
Theorem 6 If (at,v t)
T
t=1 be a ﬁnite sequence, where (∀t ∈ T ):at ∈ RI
+ and
vt ∈ RI
++,s a t i s ﬁes condition 3, then ∃V :
Q
i∈I
£
0,ai
¤
−→ R,d i ﬀerentiable and
strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: V (a) >V(at)= ⇒ vt · a>v t · at
and
(∀t ∈ T )
Ã
∀a ∈
Y
i∈I
Ai
!
: vt · a<v t · at =⇒ V (a) <V(at)
Proof. Since
Q
i∈I
£
0,ai
¤
is compact, it follows from condition 3 and the theo-
rem in Chiappori and Rochet (1987),28 that there exists V :
Q
i∈I
£
0,ai
¤
−→ R,
inﬁnitely diﬀerentiable and strongly concave, such that
(∀t ∈ T ):at ∈ Arg max
a∈RI
+:vt·a6vt·at
V (a)
Now, ﬁx t ∈ T and a ∈
Q
i∈I
Ai.I fV (a) >V(at), it follows directly from the
previous condition that vt · a>v t · at. If, on the other hand, vt · a<v t · at and
V (a) > V (at), it then follows that ∀θ ∈ (0,1)
vt · (θa+( 1− θ)at) <v t · at
whereas, by strong concavity,
V (θa+( 1− θ)at) >V(at)
which contradicts the previous condition.
28Displacing the origin of RI
+ if necessary.
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